"Darwinian Rational Expectations" (2022) Journal of Economic Methodology [Online]
The rational expectations hypothesis holds that agents should be modeled as not making systematic forecasting errors and has become a central model-building principle of modern economics. The hypothesis is often justified on the grounds that it coheres with the general methodological principle of economic rationality. In this article, I propose a novel Darwinian market justification for rational expectations which does not require either structural knowledge or statistical learning, as is commonly required in the economic literature. Rather, this Darwinian market account reconceives rationality as a market level phenomenon instead of as an individualistic property.
“Crisis Prices: The Ethics of Market Controls During a Global Pandemic” (2021) [With Ewan Kingston] Business Ethics Quarterly [Online and Open Access]
SARS-CoV-2 has unleashed an unprecedented global crisis that has caused the demand for essential goods, such as medical and sanitation products, to soar while simultaneously disrupting the very supply chains that allow individuals and institutions to obtain those essential goods. This has resulted in stark price increases and accusations of price gouging. We survey the existing philosophical literature that examines price gouging and identify the key arguments for regulators permitting such behavior and for regulators restricting such behavior. We demonstrate how the existing accounts are designed for localized emergencies rather than global persistent crises such as the coronavirus pandemic. In light of this, we highlight an understudied justification for price gouging that is much more salient during global crises: incentivizing increased production of essential goods. Furthermore, we pinpoint three conditions that help determine whether authorities should restrict price gouging during the coronavirus pandemic and similar global crises.